

## REPORT

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All times given in this report is local time (UTC + 2 hours), if not otherwise stated.

### Aircraft

-type & reg.:	Fokker 50, G-UKTA
Radio call sign:	UKA 33T
Date and time:	6 September 1999, at 1014 hours
Location:	South of Stavanger airport Sola shortly after take-off for a scheduled flight to Aberdeen
Type of occurrence:	Serious incident, hydraulic leak, indication of double hydraulic pump failure
Type of flight:	Scheduled commercial
Weather cond.:	Wind: 150° 12 kt. Weather: CAVOK. Temperature and dewpoint: 23 °C / 13 °C. QNH: 1011 hPa
Light cond.:	Daylight
Flight cond.:	VMC
Flight plan:	IFR
No. of persons onb. :	25
Injuries:	None
Aircraft damage:	Ruptured hose for L/H gear up hydraulic pressure
Other damage:	Nil
Commander	
-sex/age:	Unknown
-licence:	Unknown
-fl. experience:	Unknown
Information sources:	Report from assistant chief air traffic controller at Stavanger airport Sola, and a FAX from KLM uk Flight Safety Manager, dated 14 February 2000.

### SUMMARY

A few minutes after take-off from runway 18, during the acceleration period, the Fokker 50 crew transmitted on frequency 119,6 MHz an urgency message, PAN. The crew reported problems with the hydraulic systems, possible a leakage. In the cockpit the crew received flap asymmetry warning, closely followed by a low hydraulic quantity warning, which momentarily preceded a double hydraulic failure warning. ATC was requested to inspect runway and taxiways etc. for fluid. None was found while the aircraft was airborne. As it was not possible to confirm fluid location, it was presumed that the hydraulic fluid was

vented to the atmosphere. The crew decided to return to the departure airport, and requested a re-clearance.

The crew was instructed to hold in a safe area west of the aerodrome while systems were investigated and relevant pre-landing procedures for the return landing were carried out. G-UKTA was given a priority landing, and the airport emergency services were activated.

After a while, G-UKTA made a normal landing on runway 18, and from the control tower there were no visible indications of difficulties. After the roll-out, the aircraft came to a stand-still on the runway abeam taxiway A, as the nose wheel steering was inoperative. The aircraft was towed to the Braathens hangar for repair. The runway had to be cleaned for hydraulic oil spill, and was closed for approx. 5 minutes.

### **COMMENTS FROM THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD/NORWAY**

The reason for this rather incomplete report on the incident is the limited information received by the AAIB/N.

ATC at Stavanger airport Sola issued a routine report on the incident with extracts from the control tower log. Following several attempts to derive a report, either from the crew or from the company, the AAIB/N finally received a short summary of the incident from KLM UK Flight Safety Manager 14 February, approx. half a year after the incident. This report states that “the investigation was completed and reported (under our reference ASR 100/99/F50) to our Civil Aviation Authority at the end of October 1999”.

This incident indicates that the available information for foreign aircrew about national regulations for reporting incidents and accidents is not satisfactory. The received comments on the draft report clearly indicate there is a need for clarification on how and when aircrew on foreign registered and operated aircraft, shall report incidents which occurs on Norwegian territory.

Reference is made to ICAO Annex 6, Chapter 3, item 3.2, where it is stated that:

“An operator shall ensure that all pilot are familiar with the laws, regulations and procedures, pertinent to the performance of their duties, prescribed for the areas to be traversed, the aerodromes to be used etc.”

It is assumed that operators granted access to Norwegian airports are familiar with this standard and checked for ability to adhere to it. However, in order to facilitate timely and adequate reporting to the investigative authority, AAIB/N will initiate procedures and publishing of complimentary information to improve the reporting routines.