

## BULLETIN

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Date: 1999-10-15

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### Aircraft

-type & reg.: Socata-Groupe Aerospatiale TB 9, D-EVEN  
-year of man.: 1991  
-engine: Lycoming O-320-D2A  
Radio call sign: D-EN  
Date and time: 10. September 1998, at time 1110-1130 hrs  
Location: Sola CTR  
Type of occurrence: Airtraffic incident  
Type of flight: Private  
Weather cond.: ENZV METAR at 0850 UTC. Wind: 190° 11 kt. Visibility:  
6 000 m in rain and drizzle. Clouds: few at 300 ft, broken at  
500 ft. Temp./dewpoint: 14° C/14° C. QNH: hPa.  
Temporarily reduced visibility: 3 000 m.  
Light cond.: Daylight  
Flight cond.: VMC/IMC  
Flight plan: VFR  
No. of persons onb. : 4, Commander and 3 passengers  
Injuries: None  
Aircraft damage: None  
Information sources: ATS reports, the Commanders report and the AAIB/N's own  
investigations.

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All times given in this report is local time (UTC + 2 hours), if not otherwise stated.

### SUMMARY

D-EVEN was en-route from Ålborg airport (EKYT) to Stord airport Sørstokken (ENSO) on a VFR-flightplan. South of Stavanger airport Sola (ENZV) weather conditions deteriorated so much that the Commander had to be assisted by Sola radar, in order to make a safe landing at Sola airport. The weather became so bad, with low clouds and reduced visibility, that it became impossible for the Commander to continue the flight to Stord in visual conditions.

According to the ATC at Sola, the situation was difficult to handle as the Commander had difficulties with both understanding and speaking English.

The following quote from the report of the radar-controller in charge describes the main events of the incident:

" I recognise a 7 000-squawk to the north-east of Egerøy, and ask D-EN to squawk 4615. He comes up with the right call sign and mode C, which shows an altitude of 600 ft. He is then asked to continue his flight according to VFR-routing for light aircraft along the coast.

In the Revtangen area I give him the 0850 weather for Stord.... I strongly recommend him to land at Sola as we had the following weather.... The details of D-EN were passed on to Sola TWR, who in turn, due to a helicopter on the ILS approach to runway 11, did not want D-EN to enter the CTR. I decide to keep D-EN on my frequency (119.6), and give him instructions to make a 360° delay-turn at his present position. This instruction is obviously not understood as D-EN continues to fly in a northerly direction. The instruction is then repeated, still with no positive result.

Later I also discover that the Commander's knowledge of the English language is very limited. He then suggests to climb to 3 000 ft, which I strongly advise him not to do regarding the present weather conditions. I ask him if he is able to make an instrument approach but only to learn that he has no knowledge of the IFR-procedures at Sola.

D-EN is thereafter observed climbing towards 3 000 ft according to radar, for in the next minute to be seen descending again. This all takes place on the coastline between Reve and Vigdel reporting points. In the meantime Sola TWR has stopped all other traffic, alerted the fire station, and set up all approach lights and runway lights to full intensity.

I instruct the Commander to fly a heading of 020° in order to lead him towards the airport, but he just continues to fly different directions in the area within 7 NM south of the airport. He receives new headings in order to get closer to the airport, but he continues to fly different headings at altitudes of 200-300 ft. He also disappears from the radar several times. I continue to give him instructions in both English and German, and finally he ends up on final to runway 36. I give him permission to land on any runway with a southerly wind of 10-12 kt.

He lands on runway 36 at 0925, gets instruction to contact the ground controller. The ground controller then asks the Commander to contact the radar controller after parking the aircraft. We make an agreement with the AIS-office that they provide the pilot with transportation to the ATC-building in order to discuss the incident with the supervisor and me on duty, over a cup of coffee. When the pilot and his 3 passengers arrive at the AIS-office he does not accept this invitation and disappears. The AIS-office also gets the impression that the pilot has limited knowledge of English."

The incident resulted in all other traffic being held either on the ground or outside the CTR until the situation was brought under control. This caused delays for up to 15 minutes.

## COMMENTS FROM THE ACCIDENT BOARD

This kind of incident seems to occur every summer. Foreign private pilots on VFR-flights, with very limited knowledge of Norwegian weather conditions and topography and varying knowledge of the English language, ends up in situations which they cannot get out of by themselves. This incident could easily have resulted in a much worse outcome, if it had taken place at another airport with different topography and no means of radarvectoring. The ATC is familiar with these episodes, and is well prepared to handle this kind of situations. There is no doubt that alert airtraffic-controllers brought this situation under control.

The law-firm mandated by the Commander has the following comments to the draft of the final Bulletin, which are just quoted, not commented by the AAIB/N:

- " 1. It seems to be somewhat unfair to believe, that the commander of the aircraft had difficulties with understanding and speaking English. As to my personal knowledge his English is okay. In contrarely the controller did speak with such a strange accent, that both the pilot and the three passengers in the aircraft did have difficulties to understand his English.
2. Obviously the controller does not remember the incident exactly. The pilot did make the 360° circle as recommended. If necessary the passengers will witness this.
3. The reason, that the pilot climbed to ca 3 000 feet was, that the situation regarding the obstacles in the area did not seem to be save beneath this level. Unfortunately the controller could not give him reliable information regarding this problem.
4. It is true that the pilot descended after having reached the coast-line, because now he could be save of obstacles and somehow he had to declimbt down to airport-level.
5. It is true that Solar TWR did stop now the other traffic and the commander of the aircraft is thankful for this, because otherwise it might have happened an accident.
6. It is true, that the pilot did find the final to runway 36 by himself since he did not get the necessary assistance by the controler. The controler tried to explain something but he could not be understood neither by the pilot nor the passengers.
7. It is true that the pilot was asked in for a cup of coffee by the controller. It was not made clear, that the incident was to be discussed by this opportiunity. So the pilot decided to care first for his passengers to continue to his destination and second for his aircraft. He would have no problems to discuss the incident, if somebody would have said this clearly. By the way none of the passengers did understand the invitation for a cup of coffee as an offer to discuss the incident.
8. The comments from the Accident Board will truly be correct, but do not apply to my client. My client did investigate for the weather in Norway and especially on his route. But the weather changed rapidly and unexpectedly. We believe, that it should made clear to pilots, that the waether conditiones change fast in your country, which was not done. My client did rely on the weather report, which he took immetiately before starting to Norway".