Report on marine accident - Hugin, collision in Harstad on 16 February 2017
16 February 2017 a charter-RIB collided with the fountain Selsbanes Seil in Harstad harbour. 11 persons ended up in the water. Everybody was rescued, but two persons sustained serious injuries. The AIBN has assessed multiple conditions concerning the operating company, the RIB and the process around the establishment of Selsbanes Seil.
A local RIB-company had taken on bringing 21 tourists on a sightseeing tour in the waters around Harstad.
The accident occured on their way back from the trip. Two RIBs were coming towards Harstad harbour when one of them collided with a floating fountain. 10 of the 11 passengers and the driver ended up in the water approx. 150 m. from shore.
The investigation has shown that the RIB was on a collision course with the fountain for seven seconds without the skipper becoming aware of this before the collision. The visibility of the fountain, the field of vision from the helm position and the skipper’s situational awareness contributed to this.
Harstad municipality had not reported the fountain to the Norwegian Notices to Mariners (Efs), despite the fact that this was one of the conditions of its approval. The fountain had therefore not been included in nautical charts. The investigation has revealed that delays or failure to report projects to Efs is a general problem.
The operating company was unable to provide a declaration of conformity or other form of documentation proving that the boat complied with the applicable design requirements. The Norwegian Maritime Authority carried out an audit of the company following an incident in 2015, but did not uncover this.
There is room for improvement of the operator’s safety management system, particularly in terms of route planning, maintenance of life jackets and updating of nautical charts.
The current competence requirements for drivers of small high-speed passenger boats do not focus on the skills required to operate safely at high speeds.
The AIBN submits a total of three safety recommendations as a result of this investigation.
Safety recommendation MARINE No 2018/01T
The Accident Investigation Board Norway’s investigation of the accident involving Hugin on 16 February 2017 has shown that the operating company’s safety management system was inadequate in some areas and that procedures had not been adequately implemented.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that B&B Touring review its safety management system, with focus on preparing and implementing safety procedures adapted to the company and its activities.
Safety recommendation MARINE No 2018/02T
The Accident Investigation Board Norway’s investigation of the accident involving Hugin on 16 February 2017 has uncovered that the boat most likely did not meet the requirements for field of vision from the helm position. It is produced and sold several Ring Powercraft RIB 1050 with CE marking, both in Norway and in the rest of Europe, most likely without complying with the field of vision requirements.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority inspect boats of the Ring Powercraft RIB 1050 type and take any necessary actions in relation to owners and dealers of such boats in Norway and initiate notification routines towards other European authorities.
Safety recommendation MARINE No 2018/03T
The Accident Investigation Board Norway’s investigation of the accident involving Hugin on 16 February 2017 has shown that the current competence requirements for drivers of small high-speed passenger boats do not focus on the skills required to operate safely at high speeds.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends that the Norwegian Maritime Authority to introduce distinctive competence requirements for driving high-speed boats with up to twelve passengers.
|Area||Norwegian Territorial Waters|
|Name of vessel||Hugin|
|Accident type||Allision, Passenger accident|
|Vessel type||Misc. Ship|