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Safety recommendation SL no. 2012/03T
The flight crew got information that both lift spoiler systems had failed, and taught that in addition the brake system had failed. For that reason they changed to emergency brakes which did not have any anti-skid protection. The AIBN generally considers that excursions could be prevented by a better understanding of the system influence to each other related to failures of the lift spoilers and the effect that it has on the aircrafts’ stopping distance.
The AIBN recommends that EASA in cooperation with BAE Systems makes operators of the BAe 146 aware of the problem associated with inoperative lift spoilers. This should be included in both theoretical and practical training.
Safety recommendation SL no. 2012/02T
Deviation from BSL E 3-2 and ICAO Annex 14 SARPS in relation to the airport's safety area and adjacent terrain contributed to a significant extent to the severity of the accident and complicated the fire and rescue work. CAA Norway renewed the airport's technical and operational approval from June 2006 subject to a requirement for improvement of the safety area by October 2008. No compensatory measures were required during the dispensation period prior to the improvements being made.
The AIBN recommends that CAA Norway, in its system for technical and operational approval of airports, revise its practice for handling nonconformities with a view to establishing requirements for risk compensation.
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